I advocate Time-Slice Rationality, the thesis that the relationship between two timeslices of the same person is not importantly different, for purposes of rational evaluation, from the relationship between time-slices of distinct persons. The locus of rationality, so to speak, is the time-slice rather than the temporally extended agent. I motivate this claim in two ways. First is an appeal to puzzle cases about personal identity over time should be replaced by a norm which instructs you to defer to the degrees of belief of agents you take to be experts. Finally, I show that these replacement principles do all the work that the old principles were supposed to do while avoiding their problems. In sum, a time-slice-centric conception of rationality puts the theory of rationality on firmer foundations and yields better norms than alternative, non-time-slice-centric approaches.
in the scenario ought to believe without first settling the metaphysical facts about who is identical to whom. Second is an mild internalist intuition that if you are justifiably ignorant of facts about what you believed in the past, these facts should not affect what you ought to believe now. Time-Slice Rationality conflicts with two proposed principles of rationality, Conditionalization and Reflection. Conditionalization is a diachronic norm saying how your current degrees of belief should fit with your old ones, while Reflection is a norm enjoining you to defer to the degrees of belief that you expect to have in the future. But they are independently problematic and should be replaced by improved, time-slice-centric principles. Conditionalization should be replaced by a synchronic norm saying what degrees of belief you ought to have given your current evidence and Reflection should be replaced by a norm which instructs you to defer to the degrees of belief of agents you take to be experts. Finally, I show that these replacement principles do all the work that the old principles were supposed to do while avoiding their problems. In sum, a time-slice-centric conception of rationality puts the theory of rationality on firmer foundations and yields better norms than alternative, non-time-slice-centric approaches.
Introduction
Being rational seems in part a matter of having attitudes that display a certain sort of coherence and stability over time. If your attitudes fluctuated wildly, then you would be unable to successfully engage in the reasoning and planning needed for you to achieve your goals, 1 and you would be unlikely to gain (and maintain) true beliefs. Consider the following cases:
Fickle Frank
Frank is a physicist who changes his mind constantly and frivolously. At breakfast, he is pretty sure that the Everett multiple universe hypothesis is the right interpretation of quantum mechanics. By mid-morning, he abandons that belief in favor of the Copenhagen interpretation. At lunchtime, he switches camps once again, siding with the de Broglie-Bohm theory. But that doesn't last, and by afternoon tea he is firmly convinced that some sort of hidden variable approach must be right. It's not that he kept gaining new evidence throughout the day which supported different hypothesis. Rather, he just changed his mind.
The Frankfurt Physics Conference
A major conference on quantum mechanics is being held in Frankfurt. In attendance are proponents of a wide range of interpretations of quantum mechanics.
There is a team of researchers from MIT who believe that the Everett multiple universe hypothesis is the best explanation of the available data. Seated next to them is an eminent professor from Cambridge who advocates the Copenhagen interpretation. Further down the row is a philosopher of physics who recently authored a book arguing that the de Broglie-Bohm theory is correct. In all, the lecture hall is filled by advocates of at least a dozen competing quantum mechanical views.
It is natural to think that there is a deep contrast between the two cases -that Fickle
Frank is manifestly irrational, whereas for all that has been said, the Frankfurt physicists may be paragons of rationality, carefully evaluating the evidence and debating their views with colleagues. On this basis, one might conclude that you are rationally required to coordinate your attitudes with yourself at other times in a way that you are not rationally required to coordinate your attitudes with the attitudes of other people. The intrapersonal and the inter personal are importantly different when it comes to rationality.
I will argue that this conception of rationality is wrongheaded and will present an alternative, time-slice-centric picture of rationality on which there is no such deep contrast between Fickle Frank and the Frankfurt physicists, between the intrapersonal and the interpersonal.
The physicists are rationally permitted to have different beliefs not because they are different people, but only because they have different evidence (on a natural spelling-out of the case). If they -like Fickle Frank's different time-slices -had the same evidence, they would be required to have the same beliefs.
On my view, the relationship between two time-slices of the same person is not importantly different, for purposes of rational evaluation, from the relationship between time-slices of distinct persons. All intrapersonal rational requirements can be derived from principles which apply equally in the inter personal case. Being rational is just a matter of having attitudes at a particular time that are sensible given your mental state at that time; what you ought to believe does not also depend on the attitudes you have in the past or future (except insofar as your past attitudes affect your current mental state).
That's an intuitive gloss on the view I will be defending. Now I want to make it more precise. There are two ways in which requirements of rationality could make reference to the attitudes you have at other times -two ways that they could be diachronic. First, they might say that what attitudes you ought to have at a time t depends on what attitudes you have at some times other than t. These are norms where the 'ought' takes narrow scope (over just the consequent) in the conditional: 'If you are in state S 1 at t 1 , then you ought to be in state S 2 at t 2 .' Second, there might be 'wide-scope' diachronic norms, of the form, 'You ought to be such that if you are in state S 1 at t 1 then you are in state S 2 at t 2 .' On this wide-scope view, where the 'ought' takes scope over the whole conditional, it's is not that what attitudes you ought to have at a time depends on what attitudes you had earlier, but rather simply that you ought not have a certain pattern of attitudes over time. On this view, it might be permissible for you to be in state S 1 at t 1 and also permissible for you not to be in state S 2 at t 2 , nevertheless there is a global requirement of rationality that says that you ought not both be in S 1 at t 1 while failing to be in S 2 at t 2 . This global, wide-scope requirement is silent about what particular attitudes you ought to have at particular times, but instead says which combinations of different attitudinal states at different times are permissible. I deny both of these ways in which requirements of rationality might make reference to the attitudes you have at other times. I reject narrow-scope diachronic norms, so that what attitudes you ought to have at a time depends only on the attitudes you have at that particular time. I likewise reject wide-scope diachronic norms.
2 Importantly, my arguments against diachronic norms will apply equally to the narrow-scope and wide-scope versions of diachronic norms, and so this distinction, while important, will play no significant role in my discussion. One final piece to the puzzle: I also deny that, in determining what attitudes you ought to have at a time, your beliefs about what attitudes you have at other times play any special role. Here, then, is a precise statement of my view:
Time-Slice Rationality
• What attitudes you ought to have at a time does not depend on what attitudes you have at other times (except insofar as they affect what mental state you are in at that time). That is, there are no narrow-scope diachronic norms of rationality.
• There are no wide-scope diachronic norms of rationality.
• In determining what you attitudes you ought to have, your beliefs about what attitudes you have at other times are treated the same as your beliefs about the attitudes that other people have. Time-Slice Rationality follows from two compelling considerations. The first stems from puzzle cases about personal identity over time. As we shall see, there are a number of hypothetical cases in which one person undergoes an experience, such as entering a teletransportation or undergoing a complex sort of operation, which is such that it is difficult to say whether it is her who is around after the experience -whether she is around after the teletransportation or the operation . My claim is that in these puzzle cases, once we know everything about the physiologies and psychologies of all the people in the scenario, we know everything we need to know in order to determine what each ought to believe. In particular, we do not also need to settle facts about who is identical to whom in the scenario. Determining what an agent ought to believe does not require first figuring out the correct theory of personal identity over time.
This means that the requirements of rationality should not make reference to the relation of personal identity over time; what you ought to believe or do does not depend on who you are.
That is, the requirements of rationality should be impersonal. your memory-seemings are in fact veridical).
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6 Or, more carefully, you and the BIV ought to have the same perceptual beliefs. Whether you ought to have the same beliefs about, say, a priori matters will depend on our theory of a priori justification. Another complication stems from the argument of Putnam (1981) that a BIV could not possibly have the same beliefs as you, since it has not had the sort of causal contact with the external world needed in order for it to possess all of the concepts that you possess. For instance, if it has never interacted with tables (even though it has experiences table-like qualia), then it cannot have beliefs about tables. We can evade Putnam's worry by considering a recently envatted BIV which prior to envatment interacted with the external world for long enough to acquire all of the concepts that you possess, but was then envatted and fed non-veridical perceptual experiences.
7 This recently created doppelgänger is like the Swampman (Davidson (1987) ). Paralleling Putnam's worry about the BIV case, you might think, as Davidson does, that the doppelgänger could not possibly have the same beliefs as you, since it has not had time to interact with the world and thereby acquire the same concepts as you. Paralleling the move to recent envatment in the BIV case, we can get around this worry about allowing the doppelgänger to wander around in the world for a while to acquire the requisite concepts before scientists give it non-veridical apparent memories.
8 The BIV case is known as the New Evil Demon problem and is due to Cohen (1984) . Importantly, my purpose in appealing to the New Evil Demon problem is to draw a parallel between the case of perception and the case of memory, rather than to argue for some sweeping version of internalism. For this reason, there are some externalist responses to the New Evil Demon problem do not threaten my conclusions. For instance, the normal worlds reliabilism of Goldman (1986) holds that whether a belief formed in world w is justified depends on whether it was produced by a process which is reliable, not in world w, but in all 'normal' worlds. The BIV's beliefs are justified, then, because perception are processes which are reliable in all normal worlds, even though it is not reliable in the BIV's own, abnormal world (similarly for the doppelgänger's beliefs). This externalist response is not threatening to me, since it (i) does not dispute the parallel between perception and memroy, and (ii) does not dispute the claim that the BIV's beliefs (or those of the doppelgänger) are rational. Reflection are problematic and must be abandoned.
But it would be unsatisfying if nothing could be salvaged from Conditionalization and Reflection. To this end, I propose replacement principles of rationality that avoid the problems facing Conditionalization and Reflection and fit nicely with Time-Slice Rationality. With these replacement principles in hand, I show that even though there are no principles of rationality that directly concern how your attitudes at one time should fit with the attitudes you have, or expect to have, at other times, nevertheless satisfying these replacement principles at each particular time will result in your having generally coherent attitudes over longer periods of time. That is, the requirements of rationality yield coherence over time as a byproduct of a purely synchronic, impersonal notion of rationality.
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Against Conditionalization
Diachronic principles concern how you should change your attitudes over time. They say how your attitudes now should fit with the attitudes you had in the past (or will have in the future).
The most widely endorsed diachronic principle is Conditionalization, which is a principle about how to change your credences (also known as degrees of belief or subjective probabilities) over time. It states that when you learn some proposition E, your new credence in H ought to equal your old credence in H on the supposition that E. Your new credences should equal your old credences conditional on the proposition you just learned. More formally, where P 0 is your credence function before learning E and P 1 is your credence function after learning E (and nothing stronger), we have:
Conditionalization
It is a requirement of rationality that, for all H, P 1 (H) = P 0 (H | E)
Conditionalization is a standard part of the Bayesian picture of rationality. For instance, in a recent survey article on Bayesian epistemology (Talbott (2008) )), we find:
The formal apparatus itself has two main elements: the use of the laws of probability as coherence constraints on rational degrees of belief (or degrees of confidence) and the introduction of a rule of probabilistic inference, a rule or principle of conditionalization. (emphasis his) But despite its initial plausibility and widespread acceptance, I argue that Conditionalization must ultimately be rejected. Consider one such puzzle case: fission. In particular, consider a fission case involving double teletransportation. One person (call her 'Pre') will enter the teletransporter in New York. Her body is scanned, and at the moment her body is vaporized, two different molecule-for-molecule duplicates of her will be created, one in Los Angeles and the other in San Francisco. Call them 'Lefty' and 'Righty,' respectively. Lefty and Righty are qualitatively just like Pre in all physical and mental respects. Now, there is a debate about whether Lefty, or Righty, or both, or neither is the same person as Pre. But what I want to emphasize is that in order to determine what 11 In Section 1, I noted that diachronic requirements like Conditionalization can be interpreted as widescope requirements (as above, where the phrase 'it is a requirement of rationality that' takes wide scope) or as narrow-scope requirements. A narrow scope version of Conditionalization would say that if you have credence function P 0 at t 0 and then learn E, then it is a requirement of rationality that for all H you have credences such that P 1 (H) = P 0 (H | E). But I want to emphasize that the following arguments against Conditionalization apply equally whether we interpret it in a wide-scope or a narrow-scope fashion. But the considerations I raise -that saying when Conditionalization applies depends on problematic facts about personal identity over time and that Conditionalization is incompatible with forgetting or loss of evidence -applie to both the wide-scope and narrow-scope interpretations. For convenience, however, I will often talk as if Conditionalization is a narrow-scope norm. One might attempt to modify Conditionalization by replacing reference to personal identity with reference to some surrogate notion such as Parfit's R-relatedness (psychological continuity with the right sort of cause). But I think that the above considerations suggest that this proposal faces a serious explanatory challenge.
12 The defender of modified Conditionalization -with reference to identity replaced by reference to R-relatedness -must say why facts about who is R-related to whom are epistemically relevant. Of course, facts about R-relatedness may entail facts about the causal history of your beliefs which may be relevant to justification.
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But this does not provide a special role for R-relatedness in the theory of rationality. Rather, insofar as R-relatedness is relevant to justification, this relevance will follow from a more general theory about the relevance of the causal history of your beliefs to their justificatory 12 There is also a potential technical problem with this proposal. While identity is a one-one relation, Rrelatedness can be a many-one or one-many relation. One time-slice can be R-related to two (or more) past or future time-slices, which are not R-related to each other. I do not see how it would be possible to modify Conditionalization by replacing reference to the one-one relation of identity with reference to some potentially many-one or one-many relation like R-relatedness. Note also that while identity is by hypothesis all-or-nothing -it either holds or it doesn't -R-relatedness is a relation that comes in degrees. And I do not see how one could modify Conditionalization by replacing reference to an all-or-nothing relation like identity with reference to a degreed notion like R-relateness. Would the degree to which you ought to use the conditional credences of the past time-slice to which you are R-related in determining your present credences somehow have to be sensitive to the strength of your psychological continuity with that past time-slice?
13 Most internalists will resist the view that the etiology of your beliefs affects whether they are justified.
status. The relevance of R-relatedness will be merely derivative, following from more general principles. The fundamental principles of rationality need not connect what you ought to believe to facts about how you are related to different people at different times. I conclude that Conditionalization should be abandoned, and as I argue in Section 5.1, it should be replaced with a better principle which is compatible with Time-Slice Rationality.
Conditionalization and Internalism
Conditionalization is not a synchronic principle, and so it conflicts with internalism about Meacham (2010) uses the following case from Arntzenius (2003) to illustrate the conflict between Conditionalization and internalism:
Two Roads to Shangri La
There are two paths to Shangri La, the Path by the Mountains, and the Path by the Sea. A fair coin will be tossed by the guardians to determine which path you will take: if heads you go by the Mountains, if tails you go by the Sea. If you go by the Mountains, nothing strange will happen: while traveling you will see the glorious Mountains, and even after you enter Shangri La, you will forever retain your memories of that Magnificent Journey. If you go by the Sea, you will revel in the Beauty of the Misty Ocean. But, just as you enter Shangri La, your memory of this Beauteous Journey will be erased and be replaced by a memory of the Journey by the Mountains.
Suppose you in fact travel by the Mountains. Intuitively, while en route you ought to be certain (or near certain) that you are going by the mountains, but upon entering Shangri La, your credence that you went by the mountains should drop 0.5, since (i) you have no evidence that suggests that your apparent memory of mountains is real rather than illusory, and (ii)
whether your apparent memory would be real or illusory was determined by the toss of a fair 14 Suppose you are now certain that you had cereal for breakfast. At some point in the future, you will no longer remember having had cereal today, but since you will not have 14 See Williamson (2000) for further discussion. An objector might respond that Conditionalization is not incompatible with forgetting, but rather is simply silent about it. That is, Conditionalization says only that when you gain evidence E, your new credences ought to equal your old credences, conditional on E; it says nothing about what to do when you forget something or otherwise lose evidence. But if this is right, then Conditionalization is not the whole story when it comes to rational belief change. We want a theory that gives the right result about Shangri La, not one that is silent about it. What could such a theory look like? As I argue in Section 5.1, rather than supplementing Conditionalization with a special principle for how to respond to forgetting or lost evidence, we should instead adopt a single principle which deals all at once with gaining and losing evidence. This new principle simply says what doxastic state you ought to be in, given your present total evidence; it does not care whether your present total evidence was arrived at through learning, forgetting, or some combination of the two.
learned anything new that bears on what you had for breakfast today, Conditionalization says that you ought to retain your certainty that you had cereal. But this is crazy! Surely once you no longer remember having eaten cereal, you ought to drop your confidence that you had cereal. As noted by Williamson (2000) , Conditionalization builds in the assumption that your evidence grows monotonically, such that once a proposition is part of your evidence, it remains part of your evidence forever. This monotonicity assumption conflicts with internalism and is implausible on its face.
15 So much the worse for Conditionalization.
Against Reflection
Van Fraassen's (1984) Reflection principle enjoins you to defer to the beliefs you anticipate having in the future. It says that if you believe that you will later have some belief, then you ought to now have that belief. In probabilistic terms, where P 0 is your credence function at t 0 and P 1 (H) = n is the proposition that at t 1 you will have credence n in H, the principle states:
Reflection
It is a requirement of rationality that, for all H, P 0 (H | P 1 (H) = n) = n There is something right about Reflection. Suppose you are thinking about whether it will rain tonight. If you believe that later, at 9pm, you will believe that it's raining, then it would seem that you ought now believe that it will be raining at 9pm. Moreover, Reflection is a 15 I concede that it is possible to model forgetting if we use primitive conditional probabilities (which can be defined even for probability 0 propositions) and Jeffrey Conditionalization (Jeffrey (1983) ). Jeffrey Conditionalization is like standard Conditionalization, except that it can be applied even in cases where you do not become certain of any proposition. Jeffrey Conditionalization applies in cases where, as a result of experience, you change your credences in the members of an input partition {E i } from P 0 (E i ) to P 1 (E i ), your new credences should be P 1 (H) = i P 0 (H | E i ) × P 1 (E i ). Jeffrey Conditionalization can be used to model forgetting for the simple reason that any change in credences can be shoehorned into the framework of Jeffrey Conditionalization (at least assuming we have primitive conditional probabilities, which can be defined even for probability 0 propositions, may also be required). Just let the input partition be the set {{w i }} of all singleton sets of worlds (the maximally fine-grained input partition). But this sort of maneuver threatens to trivialize matters. So, in order to avoid trivializing them, we need to combine them with an intuitive conception of what it is to learn something. My claim, then is that on an intuitive understanding of learning, Conditionalization (and Jeffrey Conditionalization) are incompatible with forgetting, since forgetting is not the result of learning anything new. synchronic principle, and therefore does not conflict with internalism. It is synchronic since it tells you to defer to the beliefs you now believe you will later have, rather than the beliefs you will in fact later have.
But Reflection faces devastating counterexamples and problematically makes reference to personal identity over time, hence failing to be impersonal. Start with the counterexamples.
First, suppose you believe that you will go out drinking tonight, and you believe that while drunk you overestimate your ability to drive safely. Then, it is rational for you to believe that tonight you will believe that you can drive home safely, but this does not mean that you should now believe that you will be able to drive home safely. Second, while sitting at breakfast eating cereal, you believe that 10 years from now, you will be quite uncertain what you had for breakfast today. But you shouldn't now be uncertain about what you are having for breakfast, with the cereal bowl right in front of you! So Reflection must at least be modified to say that you ought to defer to the beliefs you believe you will later have unless you believe (i) that your future self will be irrational (as in the drinking case) or (ii) that you will have lost evidence (as in the breakfast case).
Modified Reflection
It is a requirement of rationality that, for all H, P 0 (H | P 1 (H) = n) = n, unless you believe that at t 1 you will be irrational or will have lost evidence.
Modified Reflection avoids the counterexamples facing Reflection. The problem with Modified Reflection is therefore not that it is false, but rather that it is insufficiently general. First, it is insufficiently general in virtue of being future-directed; it only applies to the beliefs you expect to have in the future. But just as there are cases where you ought to defer to the beliefs you expect to have in the future, so there are cases where you ought to defer to the beliefs you think you had in the past. If you believe that 10 years ago, you believed you were eating cereal, then you ought now believe that you were eating cereal 10 years ago. Modified Reflection, which is future-directed, should follow from a more general, and more fundamental, norm about deference which is time-symmetric. Second, it is insufficiently general by being about the beliefs you believe you will later have. Just as sometimes you ought to defer to your anticipated future beliefs, you also often ought to defer to the beliefs that you think others have. If you think that the weatherman, who is better informed about meteorological evidence and more skilled than you at evaluating that evidence, believes it will rain, then you yourself ought to believe it will rain. This arbitrariness on the part of Modified Reflection becomes especially clear in puzzle cases about personal identity over time. In a double teletransportation case like that con- in and tells her to defer to Lefty (or Righty) depends on just these irrelevant metaphysical facts. If Pre is identical to Lefty, then it tells her to defer to Lefty, but if she is not identical to Lefty, it is silent (though of course some other norm might still tell her to defer to Lefty in that case).
Modified Reflection, by being insufficiently general, has the same status as a norm against killing innocent people dressed in jeans. It is true that you ought not kill innocent people who are wearing jeans, but not because they are wearing jeans. Instead, the fact that you ought not kill jeans-wearing innocents falls out of a more general moral norm that makes no reference to jeans.
What is wanted is a general principle about whether and how to defer to the beliefs that you think someone else has, irrespective of whether this someone else is your past self, your future self, or some third party. After all, whether you ought to defer to someone should depend only on evidential considerations; that is, on how informed and rational that person's beliefs are. In Section 5.2, I propose just such a principle of deference, which makes no reference to time or to personal identity, and which subsumes Modified Reflection as a special case.
Rebutting Diachronic Dutch Book Arguments
I have argued that Conditionalization and Reflection are problematic. But there are also powerful arguments in favor of these principles. Lewis (1999) Right now, your credences in E and in H given E commit you to regard Bets 1 and 2 themselves as perfectly fair (each has an expected value of $0). Therefore, accepting the deal (taking 1 cent and Bets 1 and 2) has positive expected value (and hence higher expected value than rejecting the deal), and so you are rationally required to accept it.
At t 2 you will learn whether E. If you then learn that E, the bookie offers to pay you 1 cent if you take Bet 3:
Bet 3: pays $-35 if H and $65 if ¬H.
Your later credence in H (0.65) will commit you to regard Bet 3 as perfectly fair (having an expected value of $0). Therefore, accepting the deal (taking 1 cent and Bet 3) has positive expected value, and you are rationally required to accept it.
If E is false, and so you aren't offered Bet 3, accepting Bets 1 and 2 guarantees you a loss of $5, no matter whether H is true. And if E is true, accepting Bets 1, 2, and 3 guarantees you a loss of $5. Either way, you will have accepted bets which guarantee you a loss of $5, having gained only 1 or 2 cents (depending on whether the second deal is offered) in return.
So no matter whether E is true, your credences, which violate Conditionalization, will require you to accept deals which together guarantee you a loss. Predictably, it would be better to decline all of the deals than to accept them and guarantee yourself a loss of $5.
The case of Reflection is analogous. Suppose you violate Reflection in the following way.
You are 0.5 confident that at time t 2 you will have credence 0.65 in H. But your current conditional credence in H, given that at t 2 you have credence 0.65 in H, is 0.75, rather than the 0.65 demanded by Reflection. Now, let the proposition E in Bets 1 and 2 above be the proposition that at t 2 you have credence 0.65 in H, and the argument goes through as before.
At t 1 , the bookie will offer to pay you 1 cent to accept Bets 1 and 2, a deal which looks favorable to you at t 1 . Then, at t 2 , if E is true (i.e. if you wind up having credence 0.65 in H), he offers to pay you 1 cent to accept Bet 3. This deal will in that case look favorable to you at t 2 . Then, no matter whether E is true, the bets you accept guarantee a loss of $5, and you receive only 1 or 2 cents (depending on whether the second deal is offered) in return.
So, no matter whether E is true, your credences, which violate Reflection, will license you to accept a set of deals which together guarantee you a loss. In this way, violating Reflection leaves you predictably exploitable.
16
I find the Diachronic Dutch Book Argument, both for Conditionalization and for Reflection, to be unpersuasive for two reasons. A cooperate. But each prisoner prefers that both cooperate rather than that both defect.
The outcome that results from their both defecting is worse by each of their lights than the outcome that would result from their both cooperating.
16 See Briggs (2009) for a clear presentation of the more general argument that any violations of Conditionalization or Reflection license you to accept a set of bets which guarantees you a loss.
17 Besides the reasons noted here, Christensen (1991) notes that because Reflection faces obvious counterexamples, this is grounds for doubting whether the Diachronic Dutch Book Argument for Conditionalization is sound. See Briggs (2009) for an argument attempting to distinguish the Diachronic Dutch Book Arguments for Reflection and Conditionalization and to defend only the argument for Conditionalization. And see Mahtani (2012) for a rebuttal.
In the case of Conditionalization and Reflection where E is true, your t 1 self prefers accepting Bets 1 and 2 (plus the penny), no matter what your t 2 self does. And your t 2 self prefers accepting Bet 3 (plus the penny), no matter what your t 1 self did. Moreover, your t 1 and t 2 selves each prefer that the other reject the bets she is offered. But the outcome that results from your t 1 and t 2 selves each accepting the bets they are offered is worse by each of their lights than the outcome that would have resulted from their declining those bets. So, the Diachronic Dutch Book Argument is an intrapersonal Prisoner's Dilemma, with your t 1 self as Prisoner A, your t 2 self as Prisoner B, accepting the bets offered as defecting, and rejecting the bets offered as cooperating.
In the standard Prisoner's Dilemma, it is natural to think that neither prisoner is being irrational when she defects. Nor is there any sort of group-level irrationality. The Prisoner's Dilemma is just a case where two people predictably wind up with a mutually dispreferred outcome without anyone being irrational. We should say the same thing about Lewis' and van Fraassen's intrapersonal Prisoner's Dilemmas. These are cases where time-slices of the same person act in ways that produce a mutually disadvantageous result without there being any irrationality; the tragedy simply results from their having different beliefs about the world (in this case, different beliefs about which bets will be mostly likely to pay off).
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Second reason: The fact that violating Conditionalization or Reflection puts you at risk of exploitation is only a pragmatic reason to satisfy these principles; it does not constitute 18 Of course, there is one important difference between inter-and intra-personal Prisoner's Dilemmas. The two prisoners do not care about each other, whereas your t 1 self presumably does, and perhaps ought to, care a great deal about your t 2 self, and vice versa. But I do not think that this fact about rational selfconcern undermines my claim that inter-and intra-personal Prisoner's Dilemmas ought to be treated the same. Insofar as you ought to be concerned for your future selves (or, perhaps, for persons psychologically or physically continuous with you), this should be reflected in your current preferences rather than through an add-on principle to the effect that vulnerability to an intrapersonal Prisoner's Dilemma is ipso facto irrational.
And importantly, being concerned about your future well-being does not prevent you from being vulnerable to Diachronic Dutch Books. In the cases above in which you violated Conditionalization or Reflection, you were predictably exploitable not because your t 1 self didn't care about your t 2 self (or vice versa), but rather because they had conflicting opinions about the optimal way to promote their shared interests. Your t 1 self thought that the best way to make money (and hence promote your future well-being) was to accept Bets 1 and 2 while declining Bet 3. But your t 2 self thought that your well-being would best be promoted by declining Bets 1 and 2 and accepting Bet 3. Your were exploitable not because your t 1 and t 2 selves did not care about each other, but because their differing views about the world yielded conflicting opinions about how best to promote their shared interests. For this reason, I do not think that the fact that you care about yourself more than others entails that intra-and inter-personal Prisoner's Dilemmas should be treated differently.
an epistemic reason to do so. Moreover, there are many attitudes that are predictably disadvantageous without being irrational. For instance, there is evidence that overrating your own talents increases your chances of success in a wide range of endeavours, but this does not mean that it is irrational to have an accurate self-conception! So there is reason to doubt whether it is epistemically irrational, and not merely pragmatically disadvantageous, to violate Conditionalization or Reflection.
Compare the dialectic regarding the Synchronic Dutch Book Argument. This argument purports to show that it is irrational to have credences that violate the probability calculus, since such credences would license you to accept each member of some set of bets which together guarantee you a loss. But arguably this shows at best that it is pragmatically disadvantageous, as opposed to epistemically irrational, to have credences that violate the probability calculus.
19 Many philosophers have been persuaded by this criticism, which has led Christensen (1996) and Skyrms (1987) , among others, to try to 'depragmatize' the Dutch Book Argument, reinterpreting it so that it really demonstrates the epistemic irrationality of such credences. Christensen, for instance, focuses on the notion of credences or beliefs sanctioning as fair some betting odds. Then, he writes that 'if a single set of beliefs sanctions as fair each of a set of betting odds, and that set of odds is defective, then there is something amiss with the beliefs themselves' (457). In this way, Christensen seeks to reinterpret the Dutch Book Argument so that it really demonstrates a kind of inconsistency in credences that violate the probability calculus.
Can Lewis' and van Fraassen's Diachronic Dutch Book Arguments for Conditionalization
and Reflection also be depragmatized? Here is my best attempt (I will shortly show why it fails). The proponent of the argument should claim that in the case where E is true and you accept all three bets, your credences give rise to conflicting ought claims (that is, ought claims that cannot all be satisfied), and this indicates that the credences are themselves in conflict 20 :
19 See e.g. Kennedy and Chihara (1979) , Rosenkranz (1981) , and Joyce (1998) . 20 Why should the fact that having certain credences yields conflicting ought claims mean that those credences are irrational? The idea is this. Rational agents do not do things that they rationally ought not do. So, if having certain credences yields ought claims that cannot all be satisfied, then it is impossible to have those credences without doing something that you rationally ought not do. Hence, it is impossible to be a rational Claim (a) is supported by the fact that accepting Bets 1 and 2 (plus the penny) has positive expected value relative to your t 1 credences. Claim (b) is supported by the fact that accepting Bet 3 (plus the penny) has positive expected value relative to your t 2 credences. Claim (c) is supported by the fact that at both t 1 and t 2 , you prefer declining all three to accepting them all. So, if you violate Conditionalization or Reflection, you will necessarily do something that you rationally ought not do, and this means that violating Conditionalization or Reflection is irrational.
This attempt to depragmatize the Diachronic Dutch Book Argument rests on the assumption that the rational ought applies to sequences of actions that are performed over a period of time (in particular, the sequence of accepting all three bets), as opposed to only applying to particular decisions that are made at particular times.
This assumption that the rational ought applies to sequences of actions should be rejected by internalists and deflationists about personal identity over time.
21 They should think that what rationality requires of you is something that supervenes on your present mental states.
And so, in particular, what your options are (the things to which the rational ought applies in the practical case) supervenes on your present mental states. But your options also have to be things that you are in fact able to do, since ought implies can; you are not subject to rational criticism for failing to do a certain thing if you were unable to do that thing in the agent and have those credences, which is just to say that those credences are irrational. 21 For comparison, consider the fact that if I were 6 ft 3 in tall, this would benefit me in various ways. After all, there is evidence that taller people are more successful, popular, etc. But this does not mean that I rationally ought to be 6 ft 3 in tall. Being 6 ft 3 in tall is not the sort of thing to which the rational ought applies; I am not irrational for failing to be that tall. My claim is that performing certain sequences of action are like being 6 ft 3 in tall in this respect -performing a given sequence of actions may be beneficial without being such that I rationally ought to do so, since sequences of actions are not the sorts of things to which the rational ought applies. first place. Importantly, which sequences of actions you are able to carry out is not something that supervenes on your present mental states, since performing a sequence of actions requires the cooperation of your future time-slices.
On my view, your options consist of mental volitional acts of making particular decisions, for plausibly, which decisions you can make is something which does depend only on your present mental state.That is, ought claims (in the practical case) apply in the first instance only to decisions, and not to temporally extended courses of action like accepting certain bets in sequence.
But if the rational ought does not apply to sequences of actions, then Claim (c) above is false. And if Claim (c) is false, then my best attempt to depragmatize Lewis' argument fails.
In the absence of a compelling argument for Conditionalization and Reflection, we can reject these principles without embarrasment, just as Time-Slice Rationality requires.
22
22 An aside about resolution and self-binding: If you have the ability to somehow control your later self, then even if you violate Conditionalization or Reflection (or any of the other myriad attitudes which make you vulnerable to things resembling Diachronic Dutch Books), you will not be vulnerable to exploitation. For instance, you could simply accept Bets 1 and 2 (those offered at the first node in the decision tree) while causing your future self to turn down any subsequent bets. We could describe this as deciding or resolving to only accept Bets 1 and 2, or as accepting Bets 1 and 2 while binding yourself to a policy of accepting no subsequent bets. (Arntzenius et al. (2004) talk of self-binding, while Holton (2003 Holton ( , 2004 prefers to talk of resolutions.) So, this useful ability will get you out of trouble, even if you violate Conditionalization or Reflection.
How should we understand resolutions and self-binding? Holton (2004) suggests that making a resolution amounts to treating the matter as closed and refusing to re-open deliberation in the absence of compelling reasons to do so. If you are successful in making and sticking with a resolution to get up early and go to the gym, then when the alarm goes off, you will simply get up an go without re-litigating the issue, even if were you to re-deliberate, your early morning desires would lead you to decide to just sleep in.
If you have made a resolution in the past, under what conditions is it rational for you to stick with it? Here Holton (2003) suggests a two-tiered approach. First, there is the question of whether it is rational for you to drop the resolution and re-open deliberation. Second, if you do in face re-open deliberation, there is the question of whether the conclusion of your new deliberation should depend in any special way on the fact that you previously made the resolution in question. Holton holds that it may be rational not to re-open deliberation, even if were you to do so, you would rationally come to a different conclusion. In this way, if the resolution is still in place (meaning that you have not re-opened deliberation), then it is rational for you to go ahead and execute the resolution. But if the resolution is no longer in place (meaning that you have starting deliberating anew), it is just your present beliefs and desires that determine the conclusion you now ought to reach; having begun to reconsider,'the fact that a resolution was made before is just one consideration among many.' Note that Holton's view is in line with Time-Slice Rationality if we understand resolution as a type of mental state. For then we can understand Holton as saying that it is only if your present mental state includes the resolution in question that this resolution affects what you ought to do. Mere past resolutions which have now dropped out of your mental state as a result of your re-opening deliberation do not affect what you ought to do.
Conditionalization and (Modified) Reflection must be jettisoned from our theory of rationality. They problematically make reference to the relation of personal identity over time, and Conditionalization faces the further problem of conflicting with internalism. In this way, Conditionalization and Reflection are flawed precisely because they conflict with Time-Slice Rationality, which requires principles of rationality to be impersonal and synchronic.
Nevertheless, these principles are not completely on the wrong track, and so it would be unsatisfying to just reject these principles without finding replacements that capture what is right about them. In this section, I propose replacement principles for Reflection and Conditionalization. These principles will be synchronic and impersonal, and hence mesh perfectly with Time-Slice Rationality. The fact that these synchronic, impersonal principles avoid the problems facing Reflection and Conditionalization lends further support to the general approach advocated by Time-Slice Rationality.
Replacing Conditionalization
Many epistemologists believe in Permissivism, the claim that given a body of total evidence, there are multiple doxastic states that it is rationally permissible for you to be in. But if we take as a datum that rational agents have beliefs that evolve steadily over time rather than fluctuating wildly (as in the case of Fickle Frank), then Permissivists must invoke some further principle to prohibit you from switching around between these multiple rationally permissible doxastic states. Diachronic principles like Conditionalization fit the bill. In effect, it says that once you opt for one of the permissible prior probability functions, you have to stick with it and update with respect to that function when you gain evidence.
How can defenders of Time-Slice Rationality avoid the need for diachronic principles while still respecting the datum that wildly fluctuating beliefs are (ceteris paribus) irrational? One way is to replace Conditionalization with a claim about rational dispositions and say that at each particular time, you ought not have a disposition or policy of abandoning your current credences in favor of other credences. On this view, it is permissible to fail to conditionalize (e.g. due to forgetting or a change of heart), but it would be irrational to plan or be disposed It should be obvious that reasonable people can disagree, even when confronted with a single body of evidence. When a jury or a court is divided in a difficult case, the mere fact of disagreement does not mean that someone is being unreasonable.
Paleontologists disagree about what killed the dinosaurs. And while it is possible that most of the parties to this dispute are irrational, this need not be the case.
Rosen's point is that people often disagree about what the evidence supports, but it would be rash to say that therefore one of them is being irrational. But Rosen is too quick here. First, the defender of Uniqueness holds only that if two people disagree despite having the same total evidence, then at least one diverges from ideal rationality. But saying that someone fails to meet the demanding standard of ideal rationality is not to say that that person is crazy. So while Rosen is right that none of the jurors need be irrational, in the sense of being significantly less rational than the rest of us, this doesn't mean that none is irrational, in the sense of failing to be ideally rational. Second, even though the jurors might share the same evidence, in the sense of having seen the same presentations by the defense and the prosecution, this does not mean that they share the same total evidence. For a juror's total evidence includes not only the evidence presented in court, but also her background knowledge, memories, and the like.
To get a counterexample to Uniqueness, we need a case where people with the same total evidence disagree without any of them being irrational. Third, it is plausible that once the jurors, or the paleontologists, learn about their disagreement, they should converge in their opinions. 25 If this is right, then once they share their total evidence, which includes evidence of which conclusions each initially arrived at, they really ought to have the same opinion about the matter at hand.
On an orthodox Bayesian picture on which rational doxastic states are represented by a precise probability function, Uniqueness amounts to the claim (i) that there is a unique rational prior probability function which, intuitively, represents the a priori plausibility of each proposition, and (ii) that your credences at a time should be the result of taking that uniquely rational prior probability function and conditionalizing it on your total evidence at that time. I call this principle Synchronic Conditionalization:
Synchronic Conditionalization
Let P be the uniquely rational prior probability function. If at time t you have total evidence E, your credence at t in each proposition H should equal P (H | E).
26
This is a purely synchronic principle, since it specifies what your credences should be at any particular time as a function of what your total evidence is at that same time. It makes no reference whatsoever to your credences at other times.
27
Importantly, if you satisfy Synchronic Conditionalization at each time, then your credences will exhibit the sort of stability over time that we expect from rational agents. If you satisfy Synchronic Conditionalization at all times and your evidence grows monotonically, then your credences will change over time in exactly the manner required by the diachronic principle of Conditionalization.
28
If your evidence does not grow monotonically, as when you forget something, then satisfying Synchronic Conditionalization at all times will not result in your having credences that 26 As we shall see, Synchronic Conditionalization is related to Williamson's (2000) notion of Evidential Probability. Note that there is also a synchronic analogue of Jeffrey Conditionalization.
27 Synchronic Conditionalization, and Time-Slice Rationality more generally, is first and foremost a view about propositional justification -about what credences you ought to have. But epistemologists are also interested in doxastic justification -whether a belief or credence of yours, which is also propositionally justified (i.e. supported by the evidence) is also properly based on that evidence as opposed to wishful thinking or luck. For instance, an agent who was struck on the head and happened to wake up with the recommendated credences would not be doxastically justified in having those credences. But while I have been primarily concerned with propositional justificaiton in this paper, I am also attracted to a time-slice-centric conception of doxastic justification. This requires me to understand the basing relation (i.e. what it is for an agent's credences to be based on the evidence) in a synchronic way, so that it depends not on the history of the agent's doxastic state, but rather on the relations between her first-order beliefs and her higher-order beliefs about what is evidence for what and/or on her dispositions at a time (such as dispositions to have certain credences when given a certain bodies of evidence). If the basing relation can be understood synchronically, then a time-slice-centric conception of both propositional and doxastic justification is at hand.
28 To see this, suppose that at t 1 you have total evidence E 1 and at t 2 you gain evidence E 2 , so that your total evidence is now E 1 ∧ E 2 . According to Synchronic Conditionalization, at t 1 you ought to have credence function P 1 (−) = P (− | E 1 ) while at t 2 you ought to have credence function P 2 (−) = P (− | E 1 ∧ E 2 ). But, P 2 is the probability function that results from taking P 1 and conditionalizing on E 2 , so satisfying Synchronic Conditionalization in such a case, where your evidences grow monotonically from E 1 to E 1 ∧ E 2 , will result in your having the same credences that would be required by the diachronic principle of Conditionalization. This of course assumes Uniqueness, so that satisfying Synchronic Conditionalization at all times entails that your conditional credences do not change.
conform to the diachronic principle of Conditionalization. This is as it should be, since it is an implausible feature of Conditionalization that it deems forgetting to be an irrational change in belief.
Synchronic Conditionalization is closely related to Williamson's (2000) view of Evidential Probability, with two important differences. First, for Williamson, your evidence consists of all and only the propositions that you know, whereas Synchronic Conditionalization is neutral about what counts as your present evidence.
29 Second, Williamson never explicitly states that your credences should equal the evidential probabilities. Indeed, as part of his knowledge-first approach to epistemology, he rarely says anything about rational credences. By contrast, Synchronic Conditionalization is explicitly a view about rational credences. Now, I suspect that some will find the notion of a uniquely rational prior probability function, caricatured as a 'Magic Probability Function in the Sky,' implausible. But I suspect that it may not be Uniqueness that they object to so much as precision -the assumption that rational doxastic states must be represented by a precise probability function which assigns a single real number to each proposition. And as noted earlier, Uniqueness does not entail this assumption of precision. Uniqueness is just the view that given a body of evidence, there is a unique doxastic state that it is rational to be in; it is neutral about whether that uniquely rational doxastic state will consist of precise credences, or coarse-grained beliefs, or something else. 30 I have been assuming that rational doxastic states will be precise simply 29 I discuss evidence, and the worry that it will be impossible to come up with a conception of evidence compatible with Time-Slice Rationality, later in this section.
30 One attractive alternative to a version of Uniqueness based on precise credences is the view that, given your total evidence, the uniquely rational doxastic state for you to be in will be one in which you have imprecise credences (sometimes called unsharp, mushy, or indeterminate credences). You ought to be in a doxastic state which is represented, not by a single probability function, but rather by a set of probability functions (which, following van Fraassen (1990) , is called your representor ). On this version of Uniqueness, the notion of a uniquely rational precise prior probability function is replaced by a uniquely rational prior representor -a uniquely rational set of prior probability functions. Importantly, this is picture is no more mysterious than that of the Permissivist. Where the Permissivist says that given your total evidence, your credences must be represented by a single member of a privileged set S of probability functions, the defender of Uniqueness can say that your credences must be represented by the entire set S of probability functions.
Some philosophers object to the rational permissibility of imprecise credences on the grounds that having imprecise credences makes you predictably exploitable. Elga (2010) shows that, given a plausible decision theory for imprecise credences, having imprecise credences leaves you vulnerable to a Diachronic Dutch Book. But in Section 4 I provided a general rebuttal of Diachronic Dutch Book arguments. See also Moss (2013) for a time-slice-centric defense of imprecise credences.
for ease of exposition and because this assumption is shared by defenders of (diachronic) Conditionalization.
But whether the defender of Uniqueness holds that rational doxastic states must be precise or imprecise, fine-grained or coarse-grained, the crucial point is that being in the uniquely rational doxastic state at each time will mean that your beliefs are relatively stable over time (provided of course that your evidence is relatively stable), even though there are no diachronic principles that directly require this stability. This is an instance of a more general trade-off. The more we can say about which particular attitudes you ought to have, the less need there is for principles of coherence, and vice versa.
I have been discussing diachronic principles of coherence, but the same applies for synchonic principles of coherence. For instance, Kolodny (2007a) argues that there is no need for a principle of coherence stating that you ought not have contradictory beliefs, since if you believe both H and ¬H, then at least one of your beliefs is not supported by the evidence, and hence is irrational. But note that this assumes that the evidence must either support H, support ¬H, or support neither. So assuming that the evidence determines which beliefs you ought to have, then there is no need for a separate principle of coherence.
But in the case of preferences, say, it is less plausible that there is a particular set of preferences you ought to have. Rationality does not dictate that you ought to prefer chocolate ice-cream to vanilla, or vice versa.
31 So, if we take as a datum that it is irrational to have intransitive prefence (e.g. to prefer chocolate to vanilla, vanilla to strawberry, and strawberry to chocolate), this cannot be because one of these preferences is by itself irrational. Rather, this combination of preferences is irrational; any set of ice-cream preferences is rational, so long as you don't mix-and-match and have them come out intransitive. This means we need a principle of coherence for preferences which directly states that rational preferences must be transitive. 32 The general lesson is that if a uniqueness thesis holds for a certain sort of 31 This may be controversial. Some utilitarians, for instance, might say that what preferences you ought to have is dictate by facts about the happiness of yourself and others.
32 In a similar vein, Kolodny (2007a) attempts to do away with a principle of means-end coherence, which states that you ought to be such that, if you intend to achieve end E and believe that you will achieve E only if you intend to pursue means M, then you intend to pursue means M. But his strategy for doing so assumes attitude, then coherence principles are unnecessary, whereas if uniqueness fails, then coherence principles are needed to rule out intuitively irrational combinations of attitudes. My specific claim is that Uniqueness is true, thus eliminating the need for a diachronic principle such as Conditionalization.
Uniqueness, in the form of Synchronic Conditionalization, not only does much of the work that diachronic Conditionalization was supposed to do, but also gets around the problems facing the latter. First, Synchronic Conditionalization is compatible with internalism and nicely explains why you ought to be 1/2 confident that you traveled by the Mountains in Two Roads to Shangri La. The thought is that which route you took was determined by the result of a coin toss. And your current evidence that you seem to remember traveling by the Mountains does not discriminate between your having traveled by the Mountains and your having traveled by the Sea. So your credence that you traveled by the Mountains ought to equal 1/2.
And second, because Synchronic Conditionalization makes no reference to personal identity over time, it obviously faces no trouble about how to apply it in cases of fission, teletransportation, and the like. Synchronic Conditionalization makes reference only to your current total evidence.
33
One might worry, though, that replacing (standard, diachronic) Conditionalization with that among a set of incompatible ends, there is a unique end that it is rational to intend.
33 Abandoning standard Conditionalization in favor of Synchronic Conditionalization has other benefits as well. Weisberg (2009) argues that Conditionalization is incompatible with the holist idea that all beliefs are subject to defeat by undermining evidence. Suppose that you see a jellybean and have a perceptual experience as of its being red, and in response you conditionalize on the proposition that it is red (or Jeffrey conditionalize with high credence that it is red). If you then get evidence that you are colorblind, you should reduce your confidence that it is red, but Weisberg shows that conditionalizing on the proposition that you are colorblind will leave your credence that the jellybean is red unchanged. The reason is that out the outset (before seeing the jellybean), you regarded colorblindness as evidentially irrelevant to the color of the jellybean, and conditionalizing on the proposition that it is red does not change this fact (due to a property of Conditionalization known as rigidity; see Weisberg's paper for details). (Note that saying that you ought only conditionalize on propositions about how things seem to you will not help, since even beliefs about perceptual seemings are subject to defeat.) Synchronic Conditionalization does not face Weisberg's problem, however. The jellybean case is simply a case of shrinking evidence. After seeing the jellybean, your evidence includes the proposition that it is red. But upon gaining evidence that you are colorblind, your evidence no longer includes the proposition that the jellybean is red; that proposition has disappeared from your evidence. For this reason, if you always have the credences demanded by Synchronic Conditionalization, your credence that the jellybean is red will rise upon seeing the jellybean and drop upon hearing that you are colorblind.
Synchronic Conditionalization is a Phyrric victory if we cannot also have a time-slice centric conception of evidence. First, if content externalism is true, then what your evidence is might depend on your past attitudes and on facts about personal identity over time. Content externalism is the view that the contents of your propositional attitudes do not supervene on your intrinsic physical properties. If content externalism is true, then what your evidence is will depend on your history, unless we implausibly restrict your evidence to e.g., propositions about your retinal images, since those images are arguably content-less. For instance, if your evidence includes propositions about how things appear to you, and it appears to you that there is a glass filled with water, then your having this evidence depends on your having had past causal interactions with water (as opposed to with XYZ; see Putnam (1975) ).
But Time-Slice Rationality is compatible with content externalism and its implications for thinking about evidence, since Time-Slice Rationality says that what you ought to believe at a time supervenes on your mental states at that time, not on your intrinsic physical properties.
So my view allows that facts about e.g., whether you have had past causal contact with water can affect your present evidence, provided that they do so by affecting your present mental states. Note also that while the contents of your attitudes depend, inter alia on facts about the causal history of your psychological states, they do not depend on facts about personal identity as such. Consider a case of double teletransportation, where Pre enters the teletransporter and gives rise to Lefty and Righty, two molecule-for-molecule duplicates of Pre. Whether Lefty has thoughts about water or about XYZ depends on whether Pre (or some predecessor of Pre) had causal interaction with water or instead with XYZ, regardless of whether Lefty is the same person as Pre. This is because the causal history of Lefty's concept runs through Pre, whether or not Lefty is identical to Pre or merely R-related to Pre. So facts about past time-slices causally related to Lefty's present time-slice affect the contents of Lefty's thoughts, and hence affect Lefty's evidence, independently of whether or not these past time-slices bear the relation of personal identity over time to Lefty.
Similarly, Time-Slice Rationality is compatible with Williamson's (2000) Still, one might also worry that whether you know some proposition depends on facts about personal identity, since whether you know depends on how you initially formed the belief in question. But even though whether some belief of yours constitutes knowledge depends on facts about the history of that belief, I doubt whether it depends on facts about personal identity as such. The causal history of your belief matters regardless of whether that causal history runs through past time-slices who are part of the same person as you, or instead through past time-slices who are merely R-related to you. Consider again a case of double teletransportation where Lefty has a belief which was initially formed by Pre. Whether Lefty's belief constitutes knowledge may depend on how Pre initially formed that belief. But whether Lefty knows does not depend on whether Lefty is the same person as Pre, as opposed to merely R-related to Pre. So even though knowledge depends on facts about the past, it does not depend on facts about personal identity over time. I conclude that E=K is compatible with Time-Slice Rationality, provided that knowledge is a mental state.
35
34 Again, Williamson would not agree with my verdict on the BIV case considered in Section 1, for he holds that you know propositions about the external world that the BIV merely believes, and so you have more evidence for propositions about the external world than the BIV. But differing with my verdict on the BIV case does not mean that Williamson's view is incompatible with Time-Slice Rationality.
35 The same comments apply to Burge's (1993) theory of the epistemic role of memory. Burge is criticizing Chisholm (1987) , who thinks that in long chains of reasoning, 'we must rely upon memory at various stages, thus using as premisses contingent propositions about what we happen to remember. ' Burge (462) replies that, 'Memory does not supply for the demonstration propositions about memory, the reasoner, or past events. It supplies the propositions that serve as links in the demonstration itself. Or rather, it preserves them, together with their judgmental force, and makes them available for use at later time. ' We can think of Burge as arguing that the epistemic role of memory is not to provide you with evidence consisting of propositions about what you seem to remember, but rather by supplying as evidence the propositions that you seem to remember. So, if you are doing a demonstration and you remember the premise P, 
Replacing Reflection
Reflection should be replaced by a more general principle that states that you ought to defer to the opinions of experts. You regard someone as an expert if you believe that she has strictly more evidence than you and is rational in evaluating that evidence. Then, where P you is your credence function and P A ex (H) = n is the proposition that A is an expert with credence n in H, we get:
Expert Deference
It is a requirement of rationality that, for all H, P you (H | P A ex (H) = n) = n 37 Reflection initially seemed attractive because you often regard your future selves as experts.
Typically, you gain more evidence as time goes on, and you evaluate that new evidence rationally. Because of this, you very often ought to defer to the beliefs you anticipate having in the future. And the cases where you do not regard your future selves as experts are precisely then later on in the demonstration your evidence is not the proposition that you seem to remember that P, but rather simply the proposition P. But if memory is a mental state (as a Williamsonian would hold), then Burge's view is compatible with Time-Slice Rationality. For in this case, past events will play an important role in determining what you ought to believe, but only by affecting your present mental state. Of course, one might worry that memory crucially depends on facts about personal identity, thus creating a conflict with Time-Slice Rationality, since you can only remember things that you experienced (in the case of episodic memory) or that you learned (in the case of declarative memory). But Burge might be happy to replace talk of memory with talk of quasi-memory (following Parfit (1984) ), which is just like memory but without the requirement of personal identity.
36 See Williamson (2010) for an alternative Bayesian epistemological theory which likewise rejects standard Conditionalization and is fully synchronic. Williamson's theory differs from mine by not requiring Uniqueness.
37 See Elga (2007) for excellent discussion of a variety of different kinds of deference principles. Note that the propositions in {n : P A ex (H) = n} do not form a partition. For while they are mutually exclusive, they are not jointly exhaustive, since there is also the possibility that A is not an expert at all.
those that constitute counterexamples to Reflection -namely cases where you believe you will later be irrational or will have lost evidence. Therefore, Expert Deference avoids the counterexamples that plagued Reflection.
In addition, Expert Deference, unlike Reflection, is non-arbitrary. It makes no distinction between the past and the future, or between yourself and others. So in cases where you regard your previous self as an expert in some area (like what you had for breakfast 10 years ago), Expert Deference instructs you to defer to the beliefs you think you had, whereas Reflection is silent. And in cases where you regard some other person as an expert in some area, Expert
Deference instructs you to defer to that expert's views, whereas Reflection is again silent.
Moreover, because Expert Deference is impersonal in this way, we do not have to settle on the right theory of personal identity in order to apply it in particular cases.
One might worry that Expert Deference is inconsistent, as it would give conflicting recommendations in cases where experts disagree with each other. For you cannot simultaneously defer to the opinion of one expert and defer to the opinion of another expert if the two experts have different views. If Al the Expert thinks that rain is 0.5 likely while Bob the Expert thinks it is 0.75 likely, you cannot match you credence in rain to Al's credence and to Bob's credence; you cannot simultaneously have credence 0.5 in rain and credence 0.75 in rain.
It is of course possible for there to exist experts who disagree with each other. It is possible for there to be one rational agent with more evidence than you who has credence n in H and another who has credence m = n in H. Is the mere possibility of disagreeing experts enough to show Expert Deference to be inconsistent? No. We have to be careful here. There is no inconsistency if you merely give some credence to the possibility of disagreeing experts.
There is nothing inconsistent about conditional credences such that P (H | E 1 ) = n and P (H | E 2 ) = m = n. These conditional credences are, however, inconsistent if you are also certain of E 1 and E 2 . For then, P (H | E 1 ) = n P (E 1 ) = 1 Therefore, P (H) = n P (H | E 2 ) = m = n P (E 2 ) = 1 Therefore P (H) = m = n So Expert Deference is threatened with inconsistency if it possible for you to be certain of the existence of experts with differing credences.
38 If so, then the following inconsistency arises: Bob are experts, they are rational. Assuming Uniqueness, this means that they have common priors. Now, Aumann's famous 'Agreeing to Disagree' result kicks in. Aumann (1976) showed 38 Actually, even this is not quite enough. It is not enough that you be certain that for some two experts (you know not whom) there is some proposition or other (you know not which) such that they have different credences (you know not what they are) in that proposition. Expert Deference is only threatened with inconsistency if you could be certain that for some particular proposition H and for some particular numbers n and m = n, there is some particular expert A with credence n in H and also some particular expert B with credence m in H.
39 A more explicit proof that knowledge of the credences of two experts entails that they have common knowledge of each other's credences relies on a KK thesis, that if you know H then you know that you know H. See [REFERENCE DELETED] for details. This is certainly far from uncontroversial, even as an idealizing assumption, but it is nonetheless needed here. See Greco (ms) for a defense of KK.
that if two agents with common priors have common knowledge of each other's credences in a proposition H, then their credences in H must be the same. So Alice and Bob must have the same credence in H. Therefore, Expert Deference will not give conflicting advice in this case.
In sum, by the definition of expertise, experts must satisfy Aumann's assumptions of common priors and common knowledge of credences in the relevant proposition, and so cannot have different credences in that proposition. (I hasten to add that I employed talk of knowledge merely for convenience. We could replace 'knows H' with 'assigns credence 1 to H,' and everything, including Aumann's proof, would go through in just the same way, provided that we assume that credence 1 is only assigned to truths.)
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Returning to the overall conclusion of this section, Modified Reflection should be subsumed as a special case of a more general, impersonal principle of deference to expert opinion. In this way, we arrive at a better-motivated, more elegant deference principle which treats the intrapersonal case of deference to your later selves in the way way as it treats the inter personal case of deference to other agents. This principle of Expert Deference is thus an improvement over Modified Reflection and, not coincidentally in my view, right in line with Time-Slice Rationality.
Conclusion
I have defended a picture of rationality on which the relationship between time-slices of the same person is treated no differently from the relationship between time-slices of distinct persons. What you ought to believe does not depend on the attitudes you have (or believe 40 Admittedly, I have blocked one possible route to the inconsistency of Expert Deference, and indeed the most natural one. But inconsistency could also arise, for instance, if you are certain that A and B are each experts, but your expectation of A's credence in H differs from your expectation of B's credence in H. Two comments: First, I am not sure how likely it is that this sort of situation could or would arise in real life, and so I am not sure how substantial a worry it is. Second, if we make certain idealizing assumptions, then we can appeal to a proof of Briggs (2009, p. 69, fn 4) , who shows that a related principle, Qualified Reflection, follows from the axioms of the probability calculus and hence must be consistent. Given my assumption of Uniqueness (so that experts must have the same priors), the proof that Qualified Reflection follows from the axioms can also be used to show that Expert Deference follows from the axioms. The most controversial assumption appealed to by Briggs is that the expert's possible evidence propositions form a partition; this partitionality assumption in effect embodies a luminosity assumption and will therefore be objected to by some philosophers.
you have) at other times. This view is motivated by an internalist intuition (that what you ought to believe shouldn't depend on your past beliefs of which you may be ignorant) and a deflationary view of personal identity over time (that it is implausible that determining what you ought to believe requires settling on the correct theory about puzzle cases like fission).
The proposed principles of Conditionalization and Reflection conflict with this time-slice centric view of rationality. They face a host of problems, but these problems disappear when they are replaced with synchronic, impersonal principles -Synchronic Conditionalization and Expert Deference -which do much of the same work. In this way, we can recover what was right with Conditionalization and Reflection while avoiding what was wrong with them, and we can do so by moving to an independently motivated picture of rationality which treats any intrapersonal requirements of rationality as deriving from more general requirements that apply equally in the inter personal case.
